Another month, and regular as clockwork another major scheme hits problems and generates more excuses. This time it is Manchester-Preston electrification and a delay to a delay. Network Rail couldn’t meet the original six years programme, and have impressively managed another delay of a year in just two years since the Hendy Review ‘reset’ the project.
Less impressive are the excuses, which are ‘ground conditions’ and ‘uncharted mining sites’. Let us be clear, it is not the fault of the ground. The ground is just there: you can put a pile in almost anything, or redesign around it if you know what you are dealing with. It may cost a bit more, but it shouldn’t delay the programme.
That’s why you do a site investigation (SI). If it really is true that (as reported in Modern Railways) that 3 out of 10 foundations were initially unsuccessful, either the SI was seriously deficient, or it was ignored or wrongly interpreted, or follow-up surveys were not carried out as the design was finalised. I’ve been involved with rail projects and SIs in the same geological area and find it hard to believe the claim that ground conditions were so different within ‘half a metre of the surveys’ unless the survey (or its interpretation) was defective, structures were totally different to those originally envisaged, or someone just made a series of mistakes. As for mining, activity in this part of the Lancashire Coalfield ceased early, well before the 21st Century; mining for most of the 20th century is well-documented and older unrecorded workings near the railway will have settled by now. I know because I’ve used the records for other schemes. In any case, the depth of piling for electrification masts should not cause a significant risk.
Network Rail also claim that running sand and water slowed progress, but how did these come as a surprise? The same conditions were encountered (and caused delays) when the Farnworth Tunnels were re-bored in 2015 for the same electrification project. How was it possible that the lessons that should have been learnt just two years ago on the same project had been forgotten so quickly?
All this points to project management failure on a epic scale. Again. The lack of notice to operators about the delays to the scheme suggests that internal project control was, and almost certainly still is completely ineffective. The use of seasons in Network Rail’s suggestion that work can be completed by ‘’late summer or early autumn’ should not fill anyone with confidence that the programme is under control and there will not be further delays. Everyone thought and hoped that Hendy would bring a new rigour and competence, but this certainly hasn’t happened yet. What a shambles.
Less impressive are the excuses, which are ‘ground conditions’ and ‘uncharted mining sites’. Let us be clear, it is not the fault of the ground. The ground is just there: you can put a pile in almost anything, or redesign around it if you know what you are dealing with. It may cost a bit more, but it shouldn’t delay the programme.
That’s why you do a site investigation (SI). If it really is true that (as reported in Modern Railways) that 3 out of 10 foundations were initially unsuccessful, either the SI was seriously deficient, or it was ignored or wrongly interpreted, or follow-up surveys were not carried out as the design was finalised. I’ve been involved with rail projects and SIs in the same geological area and find it hard to believe the claim that ground conditions were so different within ‘half a metre of the surveys’ unless the survey (or its interpretation) was defective, structures were totally different to those originally envisaged, or someone just made a series of mistakes. As for mining, activity in this part of the Lancashire Coalfield ceased early, well before the 21st Century; mining for most of the 20th century is well-documented and older unrecorded workings near the railway will have settled by now. I know because I’ve used the records for other schemes. In any case, the depth of piling for electrification masts should not cause a significant risk.
Network Rail also claim that running sand and water slowed progress, but how did these come as a surprise? The same conditions were encountered (and caused delays) when the Farnworth Tunnels were re-bored in 2015 for the same electrification project. How was it possible that the lessons that should have been learnt just two years ago on the same project had been forgotten so quickly?
All this points to project management failure on a epic scale. Again. The lack of notice to operators about the delays to the scheme suggests that internal project control was, and almost certainly still is completely ineffective. The use of seasons in Network Rail’s suggestion that work can be completed by ‘’late summer or early autumn’ should not fill anyone with confidence that the programme is under control and there will not be further delays. Everyone thought and hoped that Hendy would bring a new rigour and competence, but this certainly hasn’t happened yet. What a shambles.
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